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There is at least one thing that psychology of religion and practical theology have 
in common: both suffer regularly from a lack of appreciation by their direct 
neighbors. Within theological faculties, practical theology was often regarded as 
maybe the most practical, but certainly the least theological discipline. If it had to 
be taught, then probably that should be done in seminaries, but not necessarily in 
an academic setting. In similar manner, psychology of religion still has a hard time 
to find acclaim in psychological departments. More often than not – as far as I 
can see – it is located in theological departments, which does not really contribute 
to its standing among psychologists.  
This is no attempt at academic masochism. I can also tell proud stories about our 
fields, but I think it is meaningful to reflect a little bit on the marginality of the 
disciplines before considering the interactions. It is, I believe, no coincidence that 
both psychology of religion and practical theology are at least somewhat in the 
margins of psychology and theology respectively.  
Over the past century, psychology was developed as a rather atheistic discipline. 
Not only methodologically – the notion of methodological agnosticism has been 
and still is an essential contribution to the scientific study of religion – but also in 
content. Psychologists count among the most secularized groups of professionals 
and have often tended to prefer materialist and reductionist approaches to human 
life and experience. In the world of psychotherapy – say: the application of 
psychological insights to the help of individuals in distress – key notions of 
wellbeing and ideals to achieve include autonomy and individuality. But these 
notions are not necessarily compatible to religious attitudes which may stress 
dependence and communality. Religion then has been suspicious in the eyes of 
many psychologists. Moreover, within psychology experimental, hard quantitative 
studies and neurosciences are often valued more than interpretive approaches, but 
in psychology of religion we find many examples of the latter. To study religion 
then, and especially to be open to positive aspects of religion, is not the best boost 
for your academic reputation as a psychologist. 
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For practical theology, the situation is different, but the consequences are similar. 
Theology of course has a long history of reflection on religion from a participant 
point of view. Usually this reflection would take a deductive approach in which 
the authoritative religious texts and the dogmatic tradition are the key sources. 
Theologians then were by definition religious believers and often religious leaders, 
aiming at articulating the truths of the tradition for their contemporary church 
and world. In that deductive approach, practical theology was not central to the 
discipline of theology, but its application. The task of practical theology, at least 
since Schleiermacher, was to describe the guidelines to build the church based on 
the insights derived from biblical and systematic theology. Until recently, it was 
very common to appoint someone to a chair of practical theology who was 
trained in systematic theology, but I don’t know one reverse example. Apparently 
practical theology requires less specific knowledge and it certainly yields less 
theological status. 
Psychology of religion and practical theology then both lack a traditional high 
standing in their respective disciplines, partly because they go against central 
currents of the disciplines they are part of, partly they cross boundaries. That 
results in a somewhat marginal, but also critical position. I would contend, and 
maybe this is something we can discuss today, that practical theology has been 
more successful in developing that critical position and in turning its marginal 
position into an opportunity of renewing the whole field of theology, whereas 
psychology of religion is still very much at the margins of psychology proper. 
A PERSONAL JOURNEY 
Maybe at this point I can bring to the table my own experiences in the two fields. 
When I was studying theology, I often found myself at loss when we were 
engaging in the high fields of systematic theological discourse. I think I 
understood the concepts (although you can never be certain), but I really didn’t 
grasp two central issues. The first was how you could decide that one statement 
was true and the other was false. That is: what criteria would govern that 
discussion and why. Surely, some claimed that conceptual consistency or 
conformity with biblical revelation would be such fundamental criteria, but for me 
that was rather hard to swallow. If it was only about conceptual logic, wasn’t it 
mere mind games? And if the Bible was the final criterion, how could we avoid 
sectarianism in which only believers would become convinced? My search, in 
retrospect, was for an existentially engaged yet academically convincing 
perspective to religious experience.  
Having a hard time with that search in systematic theology, I chose to major in 
what was called pastoral psychology, but actually was closer to psychology of 
religion. Suddenly I found myself in a field of scholars who were far more specific 
(and convincing to me) about what would count as true or false, hypothesis or 
proof, theory or phenomenon. I enjoyed the empirical approach in which the 
search for knowledge was satisfied by a methodologically sound analysis of the 
world out there. Instead of the inspiring but elusive concepts of systematic 
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theology, we could just describe, measure, analyze. True was what could be 
proven empirically. The people I have met in the field of psychology of religion 
were usually either theologians with the same kind of frustration I had, or 
psychologists with a similar interest in religion but more background in 
psychological theories and methods. And the latter – I must say – often reminded 
me that I was not a real psychologist of religion, just like my fellow theologians 
would challenge my position as a true theologian. 
I have tried to remain an active participant in both the field of psychology of 
religion and the field of practical theology. The latter offered me a space that was 
more contested in psychology of religion. Questions of good and evil, for 
example, or of the sacred, were asked much more openly and early in practical 
theology. I have enjoyed many enthusing conversations in both domains, and 
often there was a lot of overlap between the two. So maybe I can offer something 
in reflecting on the interaction between the two. I will not tell you right away with 
which label I identify most, and I must warn you that my formal position as 
professor of practical theology is not the dead giveaway it may seem.  
DESCRIBING THE FIELDS 
If I would have to describe the two fields of psychology of religion and practical 
theology, I think the first task would be easier than the second. That does not 
necessarily mean that psychology of religion is more coherent than practical 
theology, but it does mean that there is more conceptual structure. Psychology of 
religion is indeed the psychological study of religious phenomena. That is, the 
term ‘religion’ points to the level of phenomena and the term ‘psychology’ to the 
scholarly perspective taken to analyze and interpret those phenomena. But even if 
we would agree on this simple description, we run into many questions. 
Obviously we have to deal with different definitions and theories about what 
exactly constitutes a religious phenomena. Do we focus on existing traditions or 
also on implicit religion? Do we delimit the concept in substantive or functional 
terms. Does a soccer tournament qualify as religious context? Why? Or: why not? 
And what are the psychological perspectives we bring to the task of 
understanding religion? How do we choose from among all the psychological 
theories and approaches? And of course the crucial question: to what degree do 
psychological theories help us to understand the intricacies of religion? How are 
they able to grasp the heart of what religion is? Isn’t there an intrinsic and 
unavoidable reductionism in a psychological approach? And for those 
psychological approaches that include the transcendent or transpersonal, are they 
not becoming pseudo-theologies? 
To describe practical theology is more difficult because there is less consensus in 
the field. Some would say that practical theology can be recognized by its strategic 
outlook, others by its critical normativity, still others by its conversation with 
practitioners or with social sciences, by its bridging of biblical themes with 
contemporary issues, or by the fact that it is performed by people who are 
themselves believers. And yet for each of these I can find examples of practical 
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theologians whose work does not qualify on all these criteria. I want to suggest 
that the common ground be found in a description of practical theology as the 
(empirical) hermeneutics of lived religion. In one way or other, this description 
seems to fit what we are doing and the three constitutive terms together form the 
heart of practical theology. 
In speaking about theology, I may work with a broader concept than Fraser 
Watts. He describes theology as reflection on Christian doctrine and practical 
theology as the application of that reflection on church practice. I would see 
practical theology primarily as the theological reflection on religious praxis, which 
necessarily involves empirical research, and which is sometimes closely related to 
tradition, sometimes rather distanced. I want to understand the implicit theologies 
of contemporary practices rather than apply the explicit theologies of tradition. 
In this context, I would define religion as the transcending patterns of action and 
meaning embedded in and contributing to the relation with the sacred. This is 
primarily a functional definition, aiming at maximum pliability so that we can 
account for new and different forms of religion. The core of the definition, 
however,  is the relation with the sacred, which is not an endlessly open concept. 
Without going too deep into those waters, for me the notion of the sacred at least 
implies that it is a center around which one’s life gravitates and a presence that 
evokes awe and passion. Often this is determined by the cultural context in which 
one lives and modeled by a religious tradition. I take religion as the transcending 
patterns of action and meaning embedded in and contributing to the relation with 
the sacred. That is in my view the core subject matter of practical theology. It is 
not all practical theology engages with. We may study organizational and 
psychological structures, social issues, and much more, but in the end each project 
in practical theology focuses on religion, either on the level of the phenomena we 
study or on the level of theological reflection about these phenomena. 
Practical theology, I would say, is a hermeneutical discipline. For me that word 
indicates that we want to understand lived religion from its own characteristics 
and in light of its own understandings and intrinsic normativity. We do not study 
religion as merely a psychological, sociological, or cultural phenomenon – even 
though those may be the entrance points for many investigations – but as a 
religious phenomenon. When I take the position of a practical theologian and 
work together with psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists, I constantly 
find that there are subtle but defining differences. In the end, the psychologist of 
religion is interested in the psychological processes in and behind a religious 
experience, just like a sociologist is interested in the social backgrounds and 
consequences, and the anthropologist is interested in the cultural make-up. The 
practical theologian is ultimately interested in the relation with the divine itself. It 
is the encounter with or experience of the sacred that she or he is trying to 
understand. I would say then that theology is the discipline that discerns, 
describes, interprets, explains, evaluates, and helps to construct the ways people 
speak about God – theo-logia – to God, and experience being spoken to by God. 
For me theology is tracing the sacred. 
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In and of itself, the term ‘sacred’ is not the sole property of theology. 
Psychologists of religion like Kenneth Pargament, anthropological scholars in the 
tradition of Otto and Eliade have all worked with the concept of ‘the sacred’. 
Some approach it more essentialist notions, others with a more constructionist 
view. Some use the insights of religious traditions, others the analytical scrutiny of 
social sciences, notably of psychology of religion. But somehow the notion of the 
sacred can function in this broad field of overlapping disciplines. It helps us to 
move beyond the local definitions that we find so often in denominationally 
organized practical theology, but also beyond the often more functional 
definitions we often encounter in psychology of religion. The sacred then is 
broader than the divine, but is not everything. To call something sacred implies 
that it is a center point around which we organize our lives and that it is 
experienced as coming toward us from the outside, even when we acknowledge 
that is in itself a cultural construction. 
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS OR SIAMESE TWINS 
So are these two strange bedfellows or Siamese twins? There is something to say 
for the first term. Obviously both engage with the study of religion, or of the 
sacred as it functions in the empirical reality. They are different disciplines in that 
they bring very different concepts and theories to that analysis. They often 
presuppose a different perspective of the researcher, committed to the religious 
tradition in practical theology, more independent in psychology of religion – at 
least not letting that tradition interfere with the analysis. And where psychology of 
religion usually focuses more on description and explanation of phenomena, 
practical theology engages more with normative evaluation and strategic 
development of new practices. 
And yet, I would prefer the image of Siamese twins. These are two individual 
disciplines in their own right, but they share parts of their bodies, which makes it 
sometimes difficult to discern where one starts and the ends. Some body parts 
seems to belong to only one of the two, but other parts are clearly shared in 
common. Perhaps for our discussion it can be useful to try to identify some of 
these body parts. 
On the level of the phenomena we study, we share the focus on individual 
religious practices and experiences. Prayer, conversion, religious coping; on such 
topics it is sometimes hard to say whether research projects should be called one 
or the other. But practical theology can also study social and cultural religious 
practices, bringing it closer to sociology or anthropology of religion. It may study 
societal issues, bringing it closer to ethics and political sciences. And it may study 
histories and texts, bringing it closer to humanities and the arts. Likewise, 
psychology of religion may engage with for example neurosciences, that is, focus 
on phenomena inside the human brain, and I would not expect practical 
theologians to offer much to that line of research. 
On the level of theories, we share much, although I think it is fair to say that 
psychology of religion has contributed more in terms of academically articulated 
R.Ruard Ganzevoort, Strange bedfellows 
Symposium Psychology of Religion and Practical Theology, June 4, Amsterdam 
© R.Ruard Ganzevoort 
theories from which we can derive hypotheses to be tested in empirical research. 
Practical theology usually builds fewer theories and is less focused on testing 
them. But that may be misleading. The point is that practical theological theories 
are partly drawn from the religious traditions, which means that they are 
articulated in a different discourse and sound more like spiritual interpretations 
than like academic theories. But there is a lot of potential here. Traditions usually 
offer theories on theodicy, forgiveness, conversion, and so on. And if we see 
religious traditions – like I do – as the sediment of ages of wisdom, then we 
should continue to unearth those theories and make them fruitful for our work.  
On the level of aims, there are indeed often differences between the disciplines: 
describing, explaining, evaluating, developing. I would see these as 
complementary and not conflicting. Moreover, I cannot say that these aims are 
neatly divided over the two disciplines. In both you can find examples of all four 
aims, even when the focus may be slightly different.  
As Siamese twins, we are probably destined to live together. That certainly is the 
case in my life. In the end, I would not know how to distinguish them completely 
and I use my dual belonging to enjoy the broad range of opportunities the 
combination offers. I can tell – at least sometimes – that a particular project is 
more one or the other. But quite often the label I use simply depends on the 
conversations I am part of. As Siamese twins, I am we. I can speak two languages 
and have a dispute even within one body. 
